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SHOULD FAMILIES MAKE HEALTH CARE DECISIONS?
JACQUELINE J.

GLOVER, PH.D.*

INTRODUCTION

The short answer is yes, families should make health care decisions. I write in support of so-called "family decision" acts that presume families are appropriate surrogates for incompetent patients
until shown otherwise. What follows is an articulation and critique of
the current conceptual framework for understanding the role of families, a discussion of proposals to change the conceptual framework,
and some ideas for what a reconceptualization means in clinical
practice.
I.

WHY THE

DIsPuTE?

Discussion of the role of family in health care decisionmaking
tends to focus on the extremes. We either identify with a more idealized notion of the family and downplay real difficulties like incapacity,
enmeshment, disinterest and neglect. Or we identify only with the
problems, downplaying the reality of essential and positive family involvement. We are informed by our own family experiences and by
the families we encounter in clinical practice. My own experience
teaches me that families vary widely in their reaction to the question
of whether they should make health care decisions. Most are surprised by the question, because they either assume, "of course" or
"that's the doctor's role."
Research seems to indicate that a majority of persons would prefer that family members make decisions when they cannot.' Actual
clinical practice tends to assume a role for families and health care
professionals routinely turn to families for consent, even when the
legal basis is unclear.'
Yet the authority of families is highly circumscribed. We move
quickly from the question of whether they should be involved to the
* Assistant Professor of Health Care Sciences, Pediatrics and Philosophy and Director, Program in Bioethics, The George Washington University; Director/Philosopher-inResidence, Office of Ethics, Children's National Medical Center, Washington, D.C.

1. See, e.g., Dallas M. High & Howard B. Turner, SurrogateDecision-Making: The Elderly's
FamilialExpectations, 8 THEORETICAL MED. 303 (1987); see also TIMES MIRROR, CENTER FOR
THE PEOPLE AND THE PRESS, REFLECTIONS OF THE TIMES: THE RIGHT TO DIE 12 (1990).

2. See, e.g., Judith Areen, The Legal Status of Consent Obtained From Families of Adult Patients To Withhold or Withdraw Treatment, 258JAMA 229, 229-35 (1987).
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question of how much. Perhaps the short answer in the first paragraph is more accurately "Yes, but." We do not really trust families to
3
make the "right" decision. Our laws and policies reflect Baby Doe
worries that families will provide too little care, Baby K/Wanglie 4 worries that families will insist on too much, or generic worries that families will not accurately reflect a patient's wishes, or worse, will act to
override them.'
The concept of family itself is almost conceptually irrelevant
under the current framework.6 Family integrity and interests, if legitimate at all, are always secondary to the values and interests of the
individual patient.7 For the most part, the authority for family decisionmaking flows not from concerns inherent to the family, but from
patient autonomy and patient beneficence.' The analysis of whether
a decision reflects what the patient would have wanted or what is objectively determined to be in his or her best interest does not include
the family relationship.9 To borrow Nelson's language, such accounts
of moral authority fail to take the family seriously.'
II.

CuRuEr CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

A.

Defining Family

Before discussing the current framework and its difficulties in
more detail, it is important to provide at least a working definition of
what is meant by family. For many skeptics of family decisionmaking,
one of the major problems is the difficulty in understanding who
3. The original Baby Doe case involved the withholding of highly successful surgery to
correct duodenal atresia in a baby with Downs Syndrome who subsequently died. The
limitation of life-sustaining treatment in newborns is now incorporated into child abuse
legislation. See Health and Human Services Child Abuse and Neglect Regulations, 45
C.F.R. § 1340.15 (1992).
4. Baby K is a current case involving the court-ordered treatment of a baby who is
missing all of the brain except a rudimentary brain stem (anencephaly). The hospital had
petitioned to withhold life-sustaining ventilation over the objections of the mother. See In
re Baby K, 832 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D. Va. 1993), affd, 16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied,
63 U.S.L.W. 3009 (U.S. Oct. 3, 1994). The case of Helga Wanglie involved a hospital's
petition to stop life-sustaining intervention that professionals regarded as nonbeneficial
over the objections of the husband. In re Helga Wanglie, No. PX-91-283, Fourth Judicial
District (Mn. D. Ct., Hennepin County 1991).
5. See Marion Danis et al., A Prospective Study ofAdvanceDirectivesfor Life-Sustaining Care,
324 NEw ENG.J. MED. 882 (1991).
6. SeeJames L. Nelson, TakingFamiliesSeriously, HASTINGS CENTER REP.,July-Aug. 1992,
at 6.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 6-7.
9. See id. at 9-11.
10. Id. at 6.
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counts as family. Individuals have an entire range of kin with wide
variability in how closely they are connected. Often individuals are
closer to others outside a more traditional understanding of the family unit. There are certain associations we simply find ourselves in
through birth or adoption. Yet there are also those important relationships we choose, such as our life partners and close friends.
AsJecker suggests, perhaps we should understand family more in
terms of intimacy rather than filial status." In this view, family more
appropriately refers to those relationships that are long-term and
characterized by such things as interdependence, dedication, caring,
and self-sacrifice. 1" Such terms often describe our "found" associations." The concept of family unavoidably will have some gray
boundaries and any account of decisionmaking will have to struggle
with who counts at the bedside. 4
B.

TraditionalFamily Roles and Models of Moral Authority on Which
They are Based

1. Family as Clinical Helper.--One of the oldest roles that we attribute to families in the medical setting is that of helper to the professional care team. It is the doctor who knows what is best for the
patient, and families are instrumental in helping accomplish good
medical outcomes. They provide emotional and financial support
and perform a wide range of caregiving tasks. Obligations to the patient are an outgrowth of filial obligations in general. The willingness
to provide what is needed for the patient to get better flows from love
and concern. Decisionmaking is not really a part of this model of the
role of family.
2. Family as Tape Recorder.-A more current model of the role of
the family incorporates the above helping role, but adds the responsibility for speaking for the patient when he or she no longer can. 5
Rather than assuming that doctor knows best, this model is based on
the moral authority of patient autonomy. 16 Families have a role to
play in medical decisionmaking because they can provide the missing
11. See Nancy S.Jecker, The Role of Intimate Others in MedicalDecision Making, 30 GERON65 (1990).

TOLOGIST

12. Id. at 68.

13. Id.
14. See id.
15. Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Linda L. Emanuel, Proxy Decision Making for Incompetent Patients: An Ethical and Empirical Analysis, 267 JAMA 2067, 2068 (1992).
16. See Dan W. Brock, What is the Moral Basis of the Authority of Family Members to Act as
Surrogatesfor Incompetent Patients?, 3J. CLINICAL ETHICS 121 (1992).
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ingredient to a good decision-the values, views, and preferences of
the patient. 17 The assumption is that families are in -the best position
to know what the patient would have wanted." When making medical decisions, families under this account are instructed to provide a
substituted judgement.1 9 They substitute or stand in for the patient,
but only to speak as the patient would have.2"
There are several difficulties with this model. As many authors
have indicated, recent research challenges the assumption that families do, in fact, know what the patient would want.21 Additionally, it

reduces the family to mere tape recorders of patient preferences, especially if the requirement exists for a family to provide clear and convincing evidence. The knowledge families have is usually of a more
indirect sort, based on the fact that they are familiar with values in
22
general and not necessarily tied to specific health care interventions.
As Brock points out, however, this "conventional view" of the basis for
the moral authority of families to make decisions, with its shortcomings, is not necessarily definitive. It is just that no better alternative
has yet been identified. Other sources of the moral authority of families to make decisions can be offered. 2 ' For example, the fact that
patients themselves usually prefer family members as surrogate decisionmakers provides a basis for moral authority because it respects patients' rights to self-determination. 24 Similarly, a policy or law, which
is the result of a democratic political process that supports family decisionmaking, also provides moral authority for family decisionmaking.25 Emanuel and Emanuel suggest, however, that patients would
need information about research describing the inadequacies of family proxies before exercising the proxies.2 6
17. Emanuel & Emanuel, supra note 15, at 2068.
18. Id.
19. Id.

20. Id.
21. See, e.g., Jan Hare et al., Agreement Between Patients and Their Self-Selected Surrogates on
Difficult Medical Decisions, 154 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1049, 1049-54 (1992); Allison B.
Seckler et al., SubstitutedJudgment: How Accurate are Proxy Predictions?115 ANNALS INTERNAL
MED. 92 (1991); Tom Tomlinson et al., An EmpiricalStudy of Proxy Consentfor Elderly Persons,
30 GERONTOLOGIST 54, 54-61 (1990); Richard F. Uhlmann et al., Physicians' and Spouses'
Predictions of Elderly Patients' Treatment Preferences, 43J. GERONTOLOGY Ml15, M119 (1988);
Nancy R. Zweibel & Christine K. Cassel, Treatment Choices at the End of Life: A Comparison of
Decisions by Older Patients and Their Physician-SelectedProxies, 29 GERONTOLOGIST 615, 615-21

(1989).
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Brock, supra note 16, at 121.
Id. at 121-22.
Id. at 122.
Id. at 121-22.
Emanuel & Emanuel, supra note 15, at 2070.
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3. Family as Assessor of Patient Best Interest.-Families are often
identified as appropriate surrogates because a regard for the patient's
best interest flows from the families' strong bonds of affection. Even if
they cannot or do not know what the patient would have wanted, they
will act out of their obligation to promote the individual's well-being.
There is a rich tradition that is supported in current law and policy
that families are primary care providers and have widereaching obligations to do so. The state only steps in when families cannot fulfill this
caretaking role, and the threshold for intervention is fairly high. The
duty of beneficence is the basis of this role, just as it was of the helper
role. A major difference, however, is in who gets to determine best
interests. Rather than assuming simply that doctor knows best, this
model suggests that families know best, too. A decisionmaking role is
an extension of their caretaking responsibility.
An obvious difficulty with this model is that families do not always
have strong bonds of affection or do not always act upon them. Additionally, it can be argued that families have a more subjective assessment of best interest, which cannot equal some kind of objective
assessment. The bonds of affection that provide the rationale for family decisionmaking, may, in fact, get in the way. They may not be able
to see what is 'truly' in the patient's best interest because they are too
close and cannot separate their own values and emotional and physical needs. Although some would regard the fact that families share
the consequences of medical decisions as a basis for their moral authority, 7 the above argument would suggest that it is, in fact, a moral
liability.
C.

TraditionalRole of Health Care Professionals

Families are not the only moral agents involved in medical decisionmaking for incompetent patients, and as the current conceptual
framework suggests, maybe they are not the primary ones. What
counts more than the moral obligations of the family, are the values/
preferences of the patient and the duties of the health care team.
Health care professionals are regarded as independent advocates for
the well-being of their patients, a duty that flows from professional
obligations of beneficence and respect for autonomy. Their moral
framework is patient-centered and their duties are regarded in very
individualistic terms. Families are largely instrumental to pursuing independently determined goals of patient well-being. According to the
27. SeeJohn Hardwig, Wat About the Family, HASTINGS
5, 5-10.

CENTER REP.

Mar.-Apr. 1990, at
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model, a good decision is a combination of what medicine can provide and what a patient would prefer.2" There is only indirect concern for the family. In fact, professionals are obligated to protect
their patients from the patients' families. Except for family practice, it
is almost as if the family and patient are viewed in adversarial terms, as
the common phrase "the family is not my patient" would suggest.2 9
The current conceptual framework and the roles articulated for
families and health care professionals seem largely a result of the fact
that they grew out of profession-based reflections rather than more
general moral beliefs.30 Doctors and lawyers are concerned about
their professional obligations and the institutionalized mechanisms
through which they are fulfilled. The moral questions and concerns
of individuals and families are rarely a starting point, even though we
primarily inhabit other roles besides patient and litigant. Perhaps it is
time to try and bring the two worlds closer together.
D. Expanding the Moral Authority of Families
The bases for the moral authority of families as decisionmakers
articulated above are individualistic in that they focus on the patient.
Families are viewed in primarily instrumental terms. They know the
patient's values; they are who the patient would choose; they are who
love the patient best and who will look out for his or her interests; or
they are chosen through a democratic process that aggregates the
preferences of potential patients. Other bases for family decisionmaking point to shared consequences among family members, and the
"moral importance" of the family as an essential social unit.31 However, such bases are viewed as more controversial.3 2 None focus on
the moral authority of the intimate attachment itself.
A few authors have begun to challenge this omission. Hardwig
points to the importance of considering the interests of patients' fami28. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND
BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT
89 (1983); see also HASTINGS CENTER, GUIDELINES ON THE TERMINATION OF LIFE-SuSTAINING
TREATMENT AND THE CARE OF THE DYING (1987).
29. I do not mean to suggest that all health care professionals disregard the family,
only that our current conceptual framework does not require it. Also, family practice is
itself struggling with who really is the patient, and how to view both the patient in the
family and the "family in the patient." See, e.g., Barry Hoffmaster & Wayne Weston, The
Patient in the Family and the Family in the Patient,8 THEORTICAL MED. 321, 321-32 (1987).
30. Baruch A. Brody, Hardwig on Proxy Decision Making, 4 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 66, 66
(1993).
31. See Brock, supra note 16, at 122.
32. Id.
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lies. 3 Nelson speaks of families as valuable in themselves.3 4 They are
joined by others, such as High, 5 who discusses the concept of family
autonomy, and Schoeman,"6 who discusses the concept of parental
authority. The family is an organic and enduring entity. It is not
merely the source of information about an individual's values, it is
integral in the initial and continuous development of these values. As
Brody writes,
It is not simply that the patient does not really know whether
he will be a burden to his family, and how much, until "the
facts" are better spelled out for him. At a deeper level, this
patient cannot really know what values he holds, relative to
this situation, until he goes through a process of "trying on"
various value stances and "bouncing them off of' others
whose opinions and reactions he cares about. The question,
"Is this value authentically mine?" requires for its answer
complex questions such as, "If I act this way, how would my
loved ones react? If they reacted that way, how would I feel
then? And is causing them to react that way, and feeling
about it the way that I would, consistent with the sort of person I want to be?" 37
Movement toward the moral authority of families based on the
intrinsic characteristics and value of the family itself requires movement away from the traditional conceptual framework for understanding the role of families in medical decisionmaking.
III.
A.

RECONCEPTUALIZING THE ROLE OF FAMILIES

Family as Necessary Connection-TakingIntimacy Seriously

Most of current moral deliberation seems to assume that we are
primarily strangers to one another. We are not united in any shared
conception of the good life, so a liberal framework seems essential to
help ensure that each of us can protect our interests and freely pursue
the life course that we regard as best. A liberal framework is highly
individualistic and focused primarily on preserving a sphere of nonintervention around the individual. Moral bonds are primarily of an
33. See Hardwig, supra note 27; see asoJohn Hardwig, The Problem of Proxies with Interests
of Their Own: Toward a Better Theory of Proxy Decisions, 2J. CLNICAL ETHICS 20 (1993).
34. Nelson, supra note 6, at 7.
35. High, supra note 1, at 315.
36. Ferdinand Schoeman, ParentalDiscretion and Children'sRights: Background and Implications for MedicalDecision-Making, 10 J. MED. & PHIL. 45, 45-61 (1985).
37. Howard Brody, The Role of the Family in Medical Decisions: Introductory Guest Editorial,

8

THEORETICAL MED.

256 (1987).
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individual's own making. Our social fabric is woven from actual contracts among independent agents or from some theory of ideal social
contractors.
But a theory that assumes we are basically strangers does not serve
us well when we are trying to understand obligations among intimates.
Certainly we choose some of our moral obligations, and contracts are
a major way we do so among strangers. Yet we do not choose all our
moral obligations. We simply find ourselves already embedded in certain relationships that carry with them important obligations. We are
indebted to our families for the nurturance they provide. But beyond
that, we are indebted to them simply for who they are-the people
who love us and whom we love. Our very conception of who we are
depends on the relationships in which we are involved. I am wife,
mother, daughter, sister-not only professional and citizen. My self
identity is necessarily interwoven with these other selves. As a family,
we are an emotional, social, and moral unit that is greater than simply
the collection of individual emotions, needs, or values.
The usefulness of a liberal framework is also challenged to provide a more complete understanding of interests. My interests cannot
even be fully understood independent of the interests of those with
whom I share my life. That is not to say that we share all interests in
common or that my family could not act to harm important interests
of mine. But in determining best interests, our current framework
tends to emphasize the merely biological interests that pertain to an
isolated person,3" rather than those interests that are psycho-social
and pertain to the individual within the family relationship.3 9
Any account of the role of families in medical decisionmaking
must take account of the fact that lives are shared. Not only do families have obligations to patients, but patients have obligations to their

families. Respect for patient autonomy should not mean whatever the
patient wants. Rather, a truer understanding of autonomy also incorporates the notion of responsible choosing.4 ° Health care professionals should not ignore the family and their concerns and interests,
because patients themselves must not ignore them. Respect for patient autonomy is not a license for unqualified self-concern. Another
way to conceptualize such obligations is through a principle ofjustice.

38. Hardwig, supra note 27, at 6.
39. Jecker, supra note 11, at 68-70.
40. Hardwig, supra note 27, at 8-9.
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B. Family as Commons-TakingJustice Seriously
Regarding only the interests of the patient to the exclusion of the
interests of others is simply unfair. Hardwig argues that it is wrong to
assume that the patient's interests immediately trump the interests of
others.4 1 At minimum, the priority of the patient requires argumentation. The presumption should be that all interests are equal and the
task of the family is to balance competing claims. Such balancing occurs in every other sphere of family decisionmaking. What is so special about the medical context? Even acknowledging that there are
unique vulnerabilities that attach to illness, it would be a mistake to
always regard them as overriding. As the benefits attainable for a family member who is sick diminish, the obligations of family members to
provide them diminish as well-given that they have obligations to
provide a whole range of benefits to other family members. Family
members certainly are stewards of the well-being of their sick members. But they are also stewards of the well-being of those who are not
sick. The patient himself or herself is also to be regarded as such a
steward for the well-being of other members. As Jecker writes,
A tragedy of the commons occurs if members seek to take
more common goods than they are entitled to or refuse to
make appropriate sacrifices and contributions. A commons
flourishes only if each party is willing to acknowledge that
resources are shared commodities and respect others' stake
in preserving them. Thus, even if competent patients formulate clear preferences, these preferences are not the final
word on what constitutes an ethically sound decision.4 2
Taking justice seriously in a reconceptualization of the role of
families in medical decisionmaking has implications beyond surrogacy
for incompetent members. I purposely omitted a reference to incompetent patients in the title of this article. If we truly take the role of
families seriously, we will be lead beyond the narrow confines of the
incompetent patient. The family is a necessary part of health care
decisionmaking because the patient himself or herself should make
decisions as a family member.
C. Justice Among Intimates
Yet all this talk about justice among family members seems somehow inappropriate for such an intimate sphere. We do not usually
make rights claims against each other. I wrote earlier about love and
41. Id.
42. Jecker, supra note 11, at 69.
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devotion, which seem to appeal to concepts of mercy and self-sacrifice, rather than balance sheets of interests.
More importantly, how do we determine an appropriate balance
of competing interests? Hardwig's own proposal of a family meeting
to balance everybody's interests for each medical decision4" seems farfetched. For all his discussion that suggests a unique kind of connectedness, his solution seems to be based more on individual autonomy
in a democratic process. And how does he account for special obligations to the voiceless and vulnerable? We must remember that it is
also a matter of justice when the patient does not receive due consideration. It is difficult to speak of equality in the face of circumstances
that necessarily involve enormous inequalities in ability and opportunity. The great risk of more serious attention to the interests of families is the endangerment of less powerful members. The risk of not
taking families seriously is the inability to move outside a hyper-individualistic framework to a necessary account of community obligation.
We falter because we cannot conceptualize what a proper balance
of interests would look like, especially for the hard cases. And are
they all inherently hard since we are weighing very different sorts of
claims? But before we give up because we cannot conceive of a precise algorithm for a proper balancing of familial interests, perhaps
there is ground to be gained by attention to the process rather than
the outcome. Maybe we need to learn a lot more about how to talk
about balancing interests before we decide it cannot or should not be
done.
Carse describes some tools she thinks are necessary to understand
fully what it means to be acting as a good or virtuous family member.
She writes,
what must be sought through ethical deliberation and justification is not so much individually validated solutions to
moral conflicts, as shared interpretations of problems and
collective success in promoting understanding, reconciliation, and compromise among the parties involved in a case.
We need to shift the focus in our accounts of moral adjudication away from the moment of individual choice to the process of collective reflection on the goods at stake in the
choice.
This further suggests that we must pay attention in our
ethical models of this process to those virtues needed to attune ourselves properly to the conditions of others-to
others' values, fears, capacities, commitments, predicaments,
43. Hardwig, supra note 27, at 9.
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or felt needs. Central to our conception of the moral self
will be an account of those skills that help us to express ourselves and listen to others, to interpret what others say or do
with sensitivity and insight, and to remain open in principle
to transformations in our conceptions of the good at stake. 4
The role of families can be identified primarily as one of engaging in very personal dialogue about what it will mean for all when
each becomes sick. Rather than some abstract concept of advance directives that puts primary emphasis on getting a person's wishes down
on paper, attention is paid to the values that are formed and articulated in a mutual process. An advance directive may then become a
sign that this process has reached a certain level-although the process of dialogue certainly continues.
D.

The Role of Health Care Professionals

If we shift our moral analysis away from a more professional orientation to a more family-centered one, there are important consequences that follow for our understanding of how professionals
should interact with families. There is no longer the conceptual luxury of viewing patients in isolation while viewing families only as instrumental to meeting patient needs. Professionals will have to learn
more about patients and their families and become aware, if not involved, in the deliberation about family interests. If family interests
are on the table, professionals will have to deal with them in positive
ways, and not simply as indicators that the family is not functioning as
a proper surrogate.
Some might suggest that taking families' concerns and needs seriously would diminish the role of health care professionals, rather than
increase it, as I am suggesting. Rhoden, for example, views the physician as an advisor to the family, which maintains primary control.4"
When you shift away from the dominance of the medical model with
its values, then the values of the family take priority. However, it is
inappropriate to frame discussion as either doctors win or families do,
as though decisionmaking is only an issue of power. The relationship
among patients, families, and professional caregivers certainly involves
issues of power, but that is not exclusive of the relationship. All maintain their moral agency. I think it is still appropriate to regard a good
decision as one that combines both the subjective and objective views
in a way that does not presume trumps. We must acknowledge that
44. Alisa L. Carse, Justice Within Intimate Spheres, 4 J. CLINIcAL. Em~ics 68, 70 (1993).
45. Nancy K. Rhoden, LitigatingLife and Death, 102 H.Av. L. REv. 375, 440 (1988).
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the so-called subjective and objective views are not as easily distinguished as we tend to assume. Professionals, including doctors and
lawyers, also bring their expectations and values to the discussion with
family. What is needed is greater openness and communication.
Health care professionals also must maintain their role as unique
advocates for the patient. They serve an important social function in
helping trigger both informal and formal mechanisms when families
seem to be acting in a negligent manner. Health care professionals
will be the first to raise such concerns. What is changed under a
reconceptualization is the acknowledgment that determinations of a
threshold for neglect cannot only reflect a professional perspective.
The interests of families must be part of our deliberation, not simply
an automatic trigger for suspicious surrogacy.
IV.

IMPLICATIONS FOR A RECONCEPUTALIZATION OF THE FAMILY

A.

ROLE

More Accurate Theory

One of the first implications of a reconceptualization is the development of a more accurate moral theory to help us understand our
obligations to those who are sick and vulnerable. It is important to be
sure we are operating with a theory that provides the best account of
the moral universe. One advantage is that an improved theory may
help us bridge the gap between conversations about what is owed this
particular individual and what is owed each of us together.
It is ironic to me that as modern Bioethics begins to grapple with
the limits of patient autonomy, we immediately jump over the family
to discuss concerns about the allocation of scarce resources among
strangers. Then we find that efforts at health care reform break down
because many of us simply do not care about strangers. We like to talk

about belonging to a community, but we are not sure if we want to
join. And we see it as a matter of joining. Individual autonomy must
be maintained. Perhaps discussions of justice among intimates can
help bridge the gap between an idealized notion of individual autonomy, and an idealized notion of community. Families serve as the
most basic level of community. If we can openly acknowledge the
ways in which we are already in relationships, and the obligations thus
entailed, maybe we can expand our sense of belonging.
If we continue the fantasy that we can only be concerned about
isolated patients at the bedside, we will never be able to square this

with our broader obligations ofjustice. And if we pretend that family
interests do not count, how will we ever accept that anyone else's interests count?
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One might answer thatjustice requires us to consider only universal limits and to worry about the idiosyncratic choices of families.
Ironically, we acknowledge differences in access to health care across
counties and states, perhaps, for many of us, as a starting point to a
more universal plan. Wouldn't regarding the family as a commons be
a more helpful starting point? We may solve many of our problems by
acknowledging, first of all, that patients are not entitled to unlimited
access to family resources. They are also not entitled to unlimited access to society's resources. When families are tempted to demand too
much, our theory reminds us that there are limits to what a family can
demand on behalf of a patient, because there are limits on what a
patient can demand for himself or herself. Patients have obligations
of justice, and families and health care professionals are not entitled
to behave as though they do not.
B. Improved Policy
I have tried to show how our current conceptual framework, and
the policy it supports, are deficient because they are based on a very
narrow conception of autonomy and best interests. Advance directives and professional judgment are not sufficient. Family decision
statutes are superior because they provide room for the family and a
process of mutual deliberation at the bedside.
They also diminish the role of the courts46 and help bring medical decisionmaking more in line with the role of family in other parts
of our social life. The family enjoys a great deal of privacy when it
comes to other types of decisions. Perhaps we have exaggerated the
role of the state when it comes to medical decisionmaking. Acknowledging a state interest in the preservation of life has led us to behave
as though people never die. As Rhoden points out, this exaggerated
emphasis on preserving life for as long as possible is based on a medical model. 4 '
A family decision statute strikes a proper balance between supporting the family and safeguarding individual interests. In other social arenas, families are presumed to be meeting their obligations
unless they are shown to be abusive or neglectful. The threshold is
fairly high. The burden of proof lies with those who claim that fami46. There is disagreement about whether family statutes will increase or decrease court
involvement. Emanuel and Emanuel suggest that they will increase court involvement. See
Emanuel & Emanuel, supra note 26. Capron, however, suggests that they will not. See
Alexander M. Capron, Where is the Sure Interpreter?, HASTINGS CENTER RP.,July-Aug. 1992, at
26, 27.
47. Rhoden, supra note 45, at 379.
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lies are neglecting their members. And even when they are, our social
agencies work very hard for reunification.
A family decision statute also provides a mechanism for individuals to choose the person they think is best suited to make their
choices. But it would be problematic to assume that no one exists to
make decisions in the absence of such a directive. Such a presumption falsely rests the authority for family decisionmaking solely on the
principle of respect for autonomy.
C.

Setting Limits on Family Authority

A final thorny issue must be addressed. Regardless of conceptual
framework, everyone acknowledges that there are limits to family authority. The disagreement comes in determining where we ought to
set the threshold. A more traditional framework sets limits when the
family does not "know" the patient's wishes, or has interests that make
a particular decision suspect. The family has authority so long as they
comply with an externally determined choice.
An alternative would be to assume the family has authority to
make decisions according to their own moral deliberation in dialogue
with professional caregivers, unless they can be shown to be incompetent or negligent. The standard for negligence should be the family
decision can only be overruled if no responsible mode of thinking
supports the decision.4' Families would not be disqualified simply because they disagree with professional caregivers.
On the other hand, that may be too high a threshold. But what
actually constitutes neglect? For many of us, experience with the Baby
Doe regulations has led us to question a formulation that sets the
threshold too low. Now, except in very circumscribed conditions, like
imminent death or permanent unconsciousness, nontreatment may
be considered neglect.4 9 Quality of life judgments, which are an integral part of medical decisionmaking, are denied. But what are the
boundaries?
We may reject the threshold of current Baby Doe regulations and
still maintain that it would be wrong to allow nontreatment of babies
like the original Baby Doe with Downs Syndrome. Most would agree
that some mechanism for review should be triggered if a family wishes
not to treat their elderly mother's pneumonia when she is otherwise
in good health and they have recently moved her out of her home so
48. See Schoeman, supra note 36, at 58 (referring to standards for parents' decisions for
their children).
49. Baby Doe Regulations, supra note 3.
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they could move in. But a decision not to treat a family member who
is severely demented and unaware of her surroundings should not be
considered neglect. We can only struggle in the middle and use our
paradigm cases to help draw boundaries that are necessarily gray.
CONCLUSION

I have argued that families should make health care decisions for
incompetent patients, and beyond, that even competent patients
should consider their familial obligations. A reconceptualization of
the framework for understanding the role of families will look to the
intrinsic value of family and not merely its instrumental value. Theories ofjustice among intimates will allow us to confront the worry that
families will demand too much on behalf of their loved ones. And a
concept of neglect will help us confront the worry that they will demand too little. Family decision statutes are an appropriate mechanism for balancing the interests of families and their individual
members.

